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Introduction

Focus of the Book
In the fi rst years of this century, for the third time in three decades, the United States faced a crisis over medical malpractice. Each crisis has had its unique features, but each crisis shares important attributes with its predecessors as well. In large part because there are always new persons in the policy arena, old discussions and experiences tend to be forgotten, and the same old questions are asked anew. Since each crisis stimulates new research, we know increasingly more about medical malpractice and medical malpractice insurance. In fact, we know much more than is commonly acknowledged-not that we have all the answers. For example, we do not know precisely why insurance crises reoccur, except that it is inevitable that they will. Also, evidence on the effects of past reforms, other than the ones that have been implemented repeatedly by state legislatures since the mid-1970s, is limited.
Interestingly, there is little fundamental disagreement among most researchers active in this fi eld about the nature and extent of the "medical malpractice problem" and even about many of the solutions. However, there are some important differences in emphasis in policy recommendations. Virtually all experts would agree that the current system is "ill-suited" for deterring injuries and compensating injury victims effi ciently. These same experts would agree that the issues in medical malpractice are at a crossroads, in that the policy responses to previous crises have not altered the fundamental incentives of the participants in the care, claiming, claims resolution, and insurance processes.
By contrast, there are substantial differences in views among the public at large, health professionals who are on the front line but seldom conduct quantitative analysis, medical malpractice insurers, large businesses in general, trial lawyers, and consumer groups. In large part, these differences in perceptions and recommendations for reform refl ect the adage "Where you stand depends on where you sit." In addition, to a considerable extent these differences refl ect reliance on personal experiences versus reliance on information assembled and analyzed by methods generally accepted by the scientifi c community.
While we identify defi ciencies of the existing system, we do not propose sweeping reforms. Rather, our emphasis is on achievable reforms, although achieving any meaningful reform is admittedly not an easy task. In deciding what is and what is not achievable, it is essential to consider the institutional and political context which has guided how health care is fi nanced and delivered in the United States. The experiences of other parts of the U.S. economy or of other countries are important to consider, but it is doubtful that these experiences would be replicated by the U.S. health care system, at least without substantial modifi cations.
An objective of this book is to make empirical evidence available, in a balanced fashion, to readers who do not typically read scholarly journals or attend academic conferences. Several books have been written on medical malpractice. Most are now over one or even two decades old. In addition, there has been much empirical research and writing since about 2000 which is refl ected in this book for the fi rst time.
Our evaluation of current practices is based on a substantial amount of empirical evidence and several premises. First, considerable research has been conducted on many aspects of medical malpractice, such as the claims resolution process, juries, defensive medicine, and the effects of tort reforms, especially those termed "fi rst-generation tort reforms." assessing damages and recommend that alternative approaches for scheduling damages be considered. The organized trial bar has consistently opposed legislation that would constrain the latitude that juries now have to make such determinations.
Third, for any program of reform to succeed, the fi nancial interests of health care providers must be aligned with the social objective of injury prevention and claims prevention. The fi nancial incentives that providers have to engage in error reduction and quality improvement currently are insuffi cient. Under the best of circumstances, medical malpractice alone cannot succeed in encouraging implementation of all desirable quality improvements. Yet, rather than be an ineffective or even a negative force, medical malpractice can have a productive role in deterring iatrogenic injuries and in quality improvement. 2 Fourth, the states have been laboratories for tort reform, whereas the U.S. government has been inactive. 3 Most of the recommendations in this book can be implemented by individual states. Fifth, especially when empirical evidence on effects of some promising reforms is lacking or inconclusive, the law should permit health care organizations to implement reforms. That is, in general, voluntary approaches are to be favored over legislating broad "one size fi ts all" packages.
Medical Malpractice and Tort Law
Tort law has several important goals, among the most important of which are deterring misconduct (and hence injury) and compensating injury victims. 4 Other goals of tort include meting out justice and providing a safety valve for airing victims' grievances. These latter objectives are important to maintaining a civil society. While concerns arise more frequently during times of rising insurance premiums, there are standing concerns among scholars of tort law in general and of medical malpractice in particular. Specifi cally, how successful is tort in attaining the above objectives? To date, there is no evidence that the threat of tort deters medical injuries, although such evidence exists for other applications of tort law, such as dram shop for alcohol sellers 5 and automobile liability. 6 Why the threat of a civil lawsuit is effective under some circumstances and not under others is not entirely clear. A possible explanation is that the underlying technology of injury prevention is easier in some areas than it is in others. Having a bartender call a taxicab for a patron who has consumed too many beers involves a simpler technology than is necessary for preventing a mishap in transplanting an organ.
Indicators of a Broken System
A logical fi rst step in the public policy process is to assess "what works" and "what is broken" and needing change. Diagnosis is an essential fi rst step in the policy process, and much of our attention is devoted to diagnosis, especially on the empirical evidence required for a good diagnosis.
The above rationale for tort, as embodied in such goals as injury deterrence and compensation, assumes that the legal system is effi cient and accurate in adjudicating claims. At some point, ineffi ciencies and inaccuracies tip the balance against use of tort liability. Critics often cite the ineffi ciencies and inaccuracies of tort liability in general and of medical malpractice in particular. For example, legal disputes, especially those involving medical malpractice, can take years to resolve, requiring substantial use of legal resources on both sides of the dispute. Overall, the medical malpractice process is a slow and expensive approach for compensating persons who are injured as a result of receiving (or not receiving) medical care.
Compensation under tort is indeed very expensive-when measured in terms of the legal fees incurred by plaintiffs and defendants, court costs, and insurer overhead. 7 For tort liability as a whole (not just for medical malpractice), between 40 and 50 cents on the dollar is returned to plaintiffs as compensation for their injuries, which is much lower than the share of the premium dollar returned to insured individuals in other contexts, such as private health insurance, Medicare, and Social Security. Even though the current system has these very negative attributes, it also has some important positive ones. For one, being able to sue in combination with the contingent fee method for paying plaintiffs' attor-neys gives patients who are unsatisfi ed with outcomes of care a mechanism for addressing their grievances that would not be possible through other channels. The regulatory apparatus, in principle designed to serve the public interest, is sometimes controlled or substantially infl uenced by the parties it is designed to regulate. Because of health care provider infl uence or for some other bureaucratic reason, regulatory agencies may be unresponsive to patients' complaints. Ironically, one reason that medical malpractice is so aggravating to the health care provider community is that patients' ability to fi le a tort claim empowers patients to obtain justice and compensation when other systems, likely to be more subject to providers' infl uence, fail. Not all patients' complaints prove to be meritorious in the end, but some do.
Advocates for tort see it as an effective private mechanism for meting out justice, especially when other systems, such as public regulation and self-regulation by hospitals and physicians, fail to achieve their stated purposes. Moreover, defenders of the current system argue that individualized justice is costly to achieve and hence is inherently expensive.
Fortunately, there is now a large body of empirical evidence on the performance of tort in general and of medical malpractice in particular. Unfortunately, much of the public discourse continues to be based on anecdotes, which may be valid in isolated cases but do not generalize.
The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums is cited in public discourse as an indicator that the medical malpractice system is "broken." While complaining about spending more money for insurance is certainly understandable-no one feels good about spending more for insurance-rising premiums, numbers of medical malpractice claims, and payments per paid claim are not in themselves valid social indicators that the system is broken. In a dynamic economy, expenditures on some goods and services rise and expenditures on others fall. There have been attempts to link trends in medical malpractice to increased spending on personal health services and reduced patient access to care.
8 But the empirical evidence indicates that medical malpractice is a factor of second-or even of third-order importance among determinants of increases in health care spending and of decreases in patient access to care.
If one views secular trends in medical malpractice payments and premiums, adjusted for general price changes, increases in payments and premiums have actually been quite modest, only slightly higher than the changes in prices overall. It is the substantial increase in premiums and withdrawal of medical malpractice insurance at the onset of "hard markets" that have attracted widespread attention. These premium shocks as well as shocks to availability of insurance have indeed been substantial, but sharply contrast with secular trends which have been much more moderate.
Levels, trends, and cycles in premiums, claims, and payments are invalid indicators that the system is functioning or is failing and badly in need of repair. But, as documented below, one reason that the threat of medical malpractice litigation fails to deter medical injuries is that there are too few rather than too many lawsuits, at least meritorious ones. If the state police went on strike, it would seem unlikely that the accident rate on highways would fall. In fact, having fewer troopers patroling the roads would reduce the probability of being apprehended for speeding and drunk driving. Thus, drivers might be inclined to be less cautious. Most commentators tend to be unwilling to make a parallel inference about too few medical malpractice suits-that more suits might make operating rooms safer places for patients under the knife.
Further, if medical malpractice litigation were serving a useful role, one would expect to observe situations in which more benefi cial care is given and greater precautions are taken in providing such care than would occur in the absence of the threat of tort. The lack of empirical demonstration that the threat of medical malpractice has improved the quality of care, and hence has deterred iatrogenic injuries, is much more troubling. Yet some elected offi cials gauge the success of statutory changes, called "tort reform," in terms of their effects on claims frequency (box 1.1).
Not only is the number of claims no indication of success, but such reforms have often not had lasting effects, even on claims frequency. State courts have found some of the changes to be unconstitutional. Most of the changes may have appeared to be likely to reduce claims, payments per claim, and premiums at the time they were enacted but, as documented in chapter 4, for various reasons they did not have this effect.
History Repeats Itself
During each crisis, as the medical malpractice issue gains steam, experts receive the same types of inquiries from the media. Questions include: Has this happened before? Why are malpractice premiums and losses skyrocketing? Where is the primary source of the problem-insurance markets, dispute resolution, medical errors, failure of government oversight, some other factor, or a combination of these factors? Which solutions have been tried and "work"? One's defi nition of "work" depends, of course, on one's perspective. Those who believe that premiums are too high defi ne "work" as a reduction in insurers' losses and in premiums. For the victim of a medical injury, the concept of "work" is quite different.
There are also questions of fact relating to specifi c consequences of a medical malpractice crisis. For example, are physicians really relocating because of rising premiums? Is statistical evidence from past years still relevant? The growth of managed care and fi xed physician fee schedules, which make it much more diffi cult for physicians to pass higher premiums forward to patients and health insurers in the form of higher fees, inform the responses to these questions. The responses from the early twenty-fi rst century may differ considerably from those in the 1970s and 1980s.
Four Markets
Medical malpractice is a complex topic in large part because its effects are so far-reaching. It is not only about physicians and patients, not only about lawyers, not only about insurers, and not only about governments which are cajoled into responding in times of medical malpractice insurance crisis. It is really about them all-each with different objectives, constraints, and cultures. Outcomes are determined in four conceptually distinct markets-legal, medical malpractice insurance, medical care, and government activity (not stated in any particular order). The simultaneous operation of these four markets is largely what makes the issue of medical malpractice as complex as it is. Though each market is discrete in theory, in practice they interact. Most previous studies have focused on one aspect (or one market). In this book, we analyze them all.
The Legal Market
In the legal market, injury victims and physicians as defendants demand legal services, supplied by lawyers and the courts. In theory, lawyers are to be perfect agents for their clients. But in practice, this may not occur for fi nancial and nonfi nancial reasons. For instance, choice of compensation method-paying lawyers on a contingent fee or hourly basis-may make a difference in attorney willingness to represent a client or on lawyer effort on behalf of clients, as well as certain decisions, such as whether and on what terms the dispute is resolved. 9 In discussing lawyer compensation, a report from a state governor alleged lawyer fee-splitting, noting, "It is common practice for lawyers who do not handle medical malpractice cases to refer these cases to lawyers who do specialize in this area. For simply referring a case a lawyer will negotiate a fee agreement with the other lawyer, which range[s] from 25 to 50 percent of any fee for a settlement or judgment. The referring attorney is not obligated to perform any actual work on the case." 10 Courts have expressed concerns that juries' decisions are unduly swayed by the severity and circumstances of the plaintiff's injury, but this is disputed by other studies.
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In spite of some limitations in the judicial process, the American jury gives ordinary citizens, in their roles as jurors, a part in the dispute resolution process. While insurers who engage lawyers for the defense are obligated to act in the interest of the physicians they insure, they also have their own interests, such as seeking to minimize total expense per case, which do not take account of unquantifi able losses, such as the loss of a physician defendant's reputation. Market failures would occur if, for example, (1) claimants consistently fi le nonmeritorious claims and obtain settlements, (2) payments to claimants systematically exceed injury cost, or (3) courts often make legal errors in determining liability and damages.
The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market
Another market is for medical malpractice insurance.
12 Medical malpractice insurance is part of a larger market-the market for propertycasualty insurance. This market is competitive but subject to a considerable amount of state regulation. In the medical malpractice insurance market, physicians and other health professionals are the consumers and medical malpractice insurers are the suppliers. Insurers decide which physicians to insure (whom to underwrite) and at what premium. Physicians have an underlying suspicion that they may not be well represented by commercial insurers. This is due, in part, to the fact that an individual physician, whose business is not insurance, may be no match for a large insurer whose business is insurance. For this reason, as well as the exit of many commercial insurers from the medical malpractice insurance line, physician-sponsored medical malpractice insurers were formed in many states in the mid-1970s. Many of these insurers survive today. Embedded in the premium-setting decision is the issue of risk classifi cation, 13 the process of placing insured individuals into separate groups for purposes of assigning a premium to each group. At fi rst glance, this seems like a purely technical decision, of interest only to the experts. In general, there is an important trade-off between the goal of risk-sharing which insurance provides and maintaining an incentive for policyholders to exercise due care. However, hospital liability insurance is another matter. Many hospitals self-insure for much of their coverage and buy excess insurance to cover catastrophic risk. Excess insurance is highly experienced-rated.
If a careless policyholder, or one who works in an area in which injuries are more likely to occur, pays the same premium as one who exercises due care or works in an area in which injuries are less likely to occur, there are two potentially adverse consequences. First, the incentive for physicians to exercise due care may be reduced. Second, the insured physician with a low claims risk subsidizes the physician with a high claims risk. Thus, risk classifi cation has important practical implications, not only for the premiums that insured individuals pay, but also for any effects medical malpractice insurance may have on deterring injuries.
As already noted, there are no documented deterrent effects of medical malpractice. This may partly refl ect the broad risk classes commonly employed in the medical malpractice insurance fi eld. Experience rating is used far less in medical malpractice than in other lines of propertycasualty insurance, such as automobile liability insurance. 14 For example, drivers with prior accidents or traffi c violations routinely pay higher premiums. The reason for the lack of experience rating in medical malpractice may be a common perception that outcomes of the claims are random, and hence physicians should not be made to pay higher premiums after payments are made on their behalf. Charging higher premiums for physicians who engage in risky practices, such as delivering babies, may cause physicians to stop such practices-an adverse reaction from a societal point of view. 15 Rather than charge higher premiums, insurers may refuse to underwrite high-risks, leaving high-risk physicians without coverage or having to purchase coverage from "surplus line carriers," insurers which specialize in hard-to-insure risks.
immediate causes of crisis, but these decisions plausibly refl ect more complex underlying factors.
The Medical Care Market
The third market is for medical care. Here, consumers are patients, and physicians, hospitals, and others are suppliers. Higher premiums may lead to increased medical fees. In theory, medical malpractice would lead to provision of optimal levels of care, 17 but for various reasons, there may be under-or overdeterrence (the latter called "defensive medicine"). Underdeterrence may arise from the asymmetric relationship between patients and physicians. For example, patients may fail to request certain types of care because they do not have advance knowledge that such care would potentially benefi t them. In principle, imposing liability on physicians is a method for preventing underdeterrence. However, overdeterrence could arise if the liability threat is excessive and/or imposed arbitrarily. As a result of overdeterrence, physicians may overprescribe diagnostic tests or therapeutic procedures, or avoid certain types of procedures or practice locations associated with higher probabilities of lawsuits.
Critics often use such presumed effects as a pretext for public intervention. However, it is diffi cult for physicians to argue for government assistance because higher medical malpractice premiums have depressed physicians' incomes. It is much more persuasive for physicians adversely affected by premium increases to argue that this will reduce provision of highly benefi cial medical services, such as obstetrical and emergency room care. This is not to deny the validity of such arguments, only to admit to the possibility that such arguments may be self-serving.
The Market for Government Activity
Finally, there is the market for government activity. The law-as-market view asserts that legislation (and government activity more generally) is a good demanded and supplied much like other goods.
18 Legislative protection fl ows to groups obtaining the greatest value from public sector decisions, irrespective of their impact on social welfare. Citizens are on both sides of the market, benefi ting and paying taxes. Those benefi ting more from a type of decision form special interest groups to advocate for it (in this context, physician, lawyer, and insurer groups). The cost of the policy is much more widely shared, mainly by taxpayers who do not enjoy a direct benefi t and who have an insuffi cient incentive to inform themselves about policies in advance and act in their self-interest. Political offi cials maximize the aggregate political support they receive from all interest groups. 19 In the context of medical malpractice, these offi cials are associated with executive or administrative, legislative, and judicial branches of state government. They regulate the solvency, premiums, and marketing practices of insurers. Legislatures enact laws affecting claims resolution. They create special organizational forms (e.g., mutual insurers). In addition, in some states, the state is a medical malpractice insurer, providing no-fault coverage and public reinsurance. Operated on an actuarially sound basis, publicly supplied reinsurance has much to recommend it, 20 but even so, such programs have been subject to manipulation (see e.g., box 1.2). Empirical evidence on prior effects of government intervention is often cited in debates, albeit selectively.
What Is Known and Unknown About the Four Markets?
At one end of the continuum, there is the view that nothing is known about medical malpractice, so it is necessary to resort to anecdotes. At the other extreme is the view that everything is known, so public policy remedies are obvious. Neither of these views is accurate. From an optimistic or "cup half full" perspective, scholars have presented an enormous amount of information about medical malpractice and tort liability, and insurance more generally. On the legal market, there are research fi ndings, both theoretical and empirical, on why injury victims fi le claims. 21 There are studies about Although much evidence suggests well-functioning legal markets, there is recent evidence, not specifi cally in regard to medical malpractice, that courts located in areas with high proportions of minorities and lowincome households award higher amounts of compensation than in other areas. 29 Also, medical malpractice appears to pay higher compensation to injury victims than in other contexts (e.g., auto liability).
30
In addition to research fi ndings, there is much literature on markets for medical malpractice insurance and other relevant work on propertyliability insurance. There is general literature on insurance cycles and their causes. 31 To preserve a deterrent incentive in the presence of complete insurance, experience rating is desirable. 32 Although experience The governor says the fund has money to spare, but physicians and some lawmakers say it doesn't and that it would be irresponsible to use the money for other budget expenses.
"They are trying to plug a hole in one situation, but are creating a permanent problem in another area," said Mark L. Adams, general counsel for the Wisconsin Medical Society.
In addition to worrying that injured patients won't be fairly compensated, physicians and some lawmakers say that the fund, as part of extensive tort reform efforts in Wisconsin, has helped keep medical liability insurance rates low, even as they have soared in much of the rest of the country. Wisconsin is one of only six states that the AMA says is not showing signs of being in the midst of a medical liability crisis. Less is known about effects of medical malpractice on the market for medical care. Some important theoretical work on the effects of alternative liability regimes on physician decisions has been conducted. 39 We know that in the past, premium increases have been shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher fees, 40 but this may not be possible now,
Source
given the growth of fi xed fee schedules (e.g., under Medicare Part B) and the growth of managed care. The effect of the threat of tort liability on physician care levels has been studied. 41 Medical errors remain frequent, even with the threat of tort claims. 42 Also, one study 43 found that prior claims experience is unrelated to subsequent technical quality of care. Although often asserted, there is no conclusive evidence that physicians are leaving practice on account of high medical malpractice premiums or altering product mixes (e.g., dropping obstetrics). On the contrary, in one study based on data from the 1970s and 1980s, 44 physicians who had experienced high frequency of claims were less likely to change their practices (e.g., leave the state or retire). The potential deterrent benefi t of liability may be greater under capitation than under fee-for-service, 45 but there is no empirical evidence on this. Conceptual research in economics, political science, and law has described the government market in terms quite similar to any private market. In this context, with strong, well-organized stakeholders advocating for and against change, this analogy appears to be particularly apt. Empirically, we know a lot about effects of tort reform on medical malpractice premiums, claims frequency and severity, and total loss.
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Much less is known about why states implement specifi c statutory changes in medical malpractice or property-casualty more generally.
Crises in premiums and availability of insurance appear to be leading precipitators of change. There is no quantitative evidence on the effect of lobbies on legislative decisions affecting medical malpractice. Regulatory practices of state departments of insurance have been described. 48 Government decisions ideally would be guided by both empirical evidence and well-articulated social objectives. Economic analysis of tort liability has been excellent in conceptually describing how alternative legal rules may produce socially optimal levels of care. 49 The level of care that is optimal from society's vantage point is one at which the marginal social benefi t of care equals the marginal social cost of providing it. For example, if the total cost of conducting and interpreting a diagnostic test is $1,000 per test, society's welfare is maximized if tests are conducted only on persons for whom the benefi t of the test is also at least $1,000. If the test is conducted on persons for whom the benefi t is only $10, this is a waste of society's scarce resources. Such benefi ts refl ect both the effectiveness of care in producing better health outcomes and the society's willingness to pay for such better outcomes. Such cost refl ects resource outlays for care borne by all payers as well as nonmonetary costs. For example, the price of a colonoscopy is not the only out-of-pocket cost for the procedure. There are also other costs, including transportation, the opportunity cost of the patient and a family member taking time from work or other pursuits, and the pain and suffering from preparing for the procedure and possible rare adverse outcomes from the procedure itself.
Discussing the socially optimum level of care conceptually is one thing. Determining what the marginal social benefi t and marginal social cost curves look like in practice is quite another matter. A major reason that the calculation is so complicated is that benefi ts and costs differ substantially among individuals.
50 "Defensive medicine" presumably occurs to the extent that the legal system causes too much care to be providedthat is, care for which the marginal social cost exceeds the marginal social benefi t. What this means, for example, is that if there is a one-ina-hundred chance of a person having a disease and the loss incurred if the disease goes undetected is $100,000, then the test should be conducted if its cost is $1,000 or less. Otherwise, the test should not be conducted. Defensive medicine occurs in the latter case. Although defensive medicine is said to be a major driver of health care cost growth, there really is no evidence of how much it is. 51 And health care cost growth is the wrong metric in any case. The correct method applies the principle of cost versus benefi t. The effects of various statutory changes on the well-being of injury victims, individuals as patients, physician defendants, and attorneys ultimately always involve equity issues. These issues, although considered in the political process and by the popular media, have received little attention from scholars in any discipline, with a very few notable exceptions. 52 Statutory changes in tort liability inevitably involve trade-offs.
For example, implementing limits on contingent fees has potential effects on the levels of care doctors provide to patients, since the threat of being sued may decline after the fee limits are imposed, 53 but also may raise barriers for injury victims in obtaining legal representation. Lawyers, for both the plaintiff and the defense, are made worse off, the latter because legal effort is roughly equivalent on both sides of the dispute. 54 A priori, the net effect of this statutory change on societal well-being is not clear, although the well-being of particular types of individuals is clearly affected, either positively or negatively. There are trade-offs among categories of injured persons. For example, is a person who is the victim of medical negligence more worthy of compensation than a person injured in a natural disaster, such as a hurricane or an earthquake? Currently, in a comparison of victims of medical malpractice and hurricanes, the former would generally receive higher compensation than the latter would. In the end, when there are two groups that stand to gain or lose from a public policy decision, political offi cials must make the trade-off decision in the well-being between the two groups. The best an analyst can do is identify the nature of the trade-off.
Five Myths of Medical Malpractice
Any discussion of malpractice would be incomplete without acknowledging the myths associated with medical malpractice. In some lectures and in the fi rst author's undergraduate class on health economics, the fi rst author states and discusses fi ve myths of medical malpractice. The purpose of the discussion of the myths is not only to present empirical evidence demonstrating that the statements are myths, but also to be provocative and elicit interest in the topic (though hopefully not too provocative). The fi ve myths are the following: Myth 1. There are too many medical malpractice claims.
Myth 2. Only "good" doctors are sued.
Myth 3. Dispute resolution in medical malpractice is a lottery. Myths 2-5 will be discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters. Thus, only a very brief preview is provided here.
Doctors who are sued for medical malpractice are neither of higher nor of lower quality, on average, than those who are not sued (myth 2). Some critics of medical malpractice contend that being at the cutting edge technologically makes a physician more vulnerable to being sued. There is no empirical evidence that being sued is an indicator of superior performance, as is sometimes alleged. There is some empirical evidence about differences in physician-patient relationships between those physicians with adverse medical malpractice claims histories and physicians with no claims, the latter rated by their patients as being, or at least appearing to be, more understanding, more caring, more available, and a good communicator. A more patient-oriented practice style is good defensive medicine, a point rarely mentioned in public discourse on medical malpractice.
There is a defi nite relationship, albeit an imperfect one, between independent assessments of liability and of injury cost and outcomes of legal disputes alleging medical malpractice (myth 3). Assertions that medical malpractice outcomes as a general matter are random or a lottery are not supported by the empirical evidence. Based on available evidence comparing the costs of injuries of medical malpractice claimants and compensation actually received, such claimants are, on average, undercompensated, not overcompensated (myth 4). In the one study that has compared injury cost versus compensation, compensation exceeded cost by 22 percent for claimants who received compensation at verdict. The 22 percent included payment for pain and suffering.
Practice decisions attributable to the threat of a medical malpractice suit may have raised spending on personal health services above what it would have been absent the threat, but threats of a medical malpractice suit are not a major cause of rising expenditures on personal health services (myth 5). In addition, any reduction in spending that would occur if the threat were eliminated or appreciably reduced would inevitably lead to a decline in physician and hospital revenue. For example, if 15-20 percent of personal health expenditures were eliminated due to "effective" tort reform, the health care sector would fall into a deep recession or even a depression, and depending on how funds released from the health care sector were reallocated, Gross Domestic Product for the economy as a whole might suffer more than a blip as well. Physicians would leave practice in large numbers, and many hospitals would close. Although expenditures on personal health services would probably fall, patient access to physicians and hospitals would be much worse than it is now.
Myth 1 deals with the excess number of medical malpractice claims. As background for discussing this myth, two pathbreaking studies are especially pertinent. The fi rst was conducted in California in 1974. 55 The second was conducted in New York in 1984. 56 In both studies, surveys of medical records of hospitalized patients were conducted to ascertain (1) rates of injury ("adverse events") attributable to provision of medical care to these patients and (2) rates of adverse events due to provider negligence, termed "negligent adverse events." Follow-up studies to the New York study were conducted in Colorado and Utah. In the California study, records of 20,864 randomly selected patients at twenty-three hospitals were reviewed. Records were abstracted according to a protocol and then analyzed by medical and legal experts to determine whether the injury occurred while the patient was receiving medical care and whether or not the injury could be attributed to provider negligence.
In the New York study, 31,429 records of patients were reviewed. The data collection, abstraction process, and medical and legal expert review were patterned after the process used in California a decade earlier. The California study revealed that 5 percent of patients experienced an adverse health event while in the hospital, and 17 percent of these patients suffered a negligent adverse event. In New York, the corresponding rate was 4 percent for adverse events, and of those, 28 percent were classifi ed as due to negligence.
The authors of the New York study and the Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences used estimates from the New York study to compute the annual number of deaths due to iatrogenic injuries in the United States and the number of such injuries for which providers were at fault. These estimates have been criticized on grounds that the implied number of deaths due to iatrogenic injuries is too high.
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Like any research, these studies have strengths and weaknesses; they will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. But the exact number of deaths is really unimportant. The number is large, and this should suffi ce for private and public decision-making. It is a bit like the critiques of the estimates that six million Jews died in the Holocaust-not that we wish to compare those who deny that there are numerous medical errors with those who deny that the Holocaust occurred, but our example does make an important point. Suppose the true number of Holocaust deaths were four million. Would this change the analysis in any important way?
The New York researchers obtained data on medical malpractice claims fi led on behalf of the injury victims identifi ed in their study. The authors found "invalid" claims-those not matching the study's determination of liability from raters' evaluations of the medical recordsoutnumbered valid claims by a ratio of three to one-providing empirical support to myth 1. 58 However, it is not appropriate to stop here. They also found that only 2 percent of negligent adverse events resulted in medical malpractice claims. There were 7.6 times as many negligent injuries as there were claims. Thus, there were errors in both directions: individuals fi led too many invalid claims and not enough valid claims. Do these results serve to strike down myth 1? In two important senses, the answer is no. First, many valid claims are not fi led. What is fi led is the tip of the iceberg of potentially valid claims. Second, the raters viewed only medical records for the patients when they were hospitalized. 59 In addition, the litigation process involves accumulating much more information than is contained in a single medical record. It is quite possible that with the additional information, the expert fi ndings could have been reversed. Of course, the reversal could be in both directions. Yet it seems highly likely that the true percentage of negligent adverse events resulting in claims is somewhere between 0 and 4 percent. The percentage of negligent adverse events resulting in claims is very, very unlikely to be in, say, the 50 to 80 percent range of negligent adverse events. Then how does the large number of invalid claims affect the validity of myth 1? At least at fi rst glance, there appears to be support for the allegation that there are too many lawsuits. The measurement error in estimating the number of negligent adverse events that result in claims is plausibly relevant here as well. Applying the same logic, the true ratio of invalid claims to valid claims could be much higher than three to one. Further, medical malpractice plaintiffs lose the overwhelming majority of suits for which a verdict is reached.
60 Thus, the system does weed out many invalid claims. From another perspective, litigation can be viewed as an informationgathering process; many claims that are fi led are dropped by claimants after initial investigation reveals that the claim has little or no legal merit. 61 Would we want to say that the large number of negative test results provides conclusive evidence of overtesting, even when the tests are justifi able ex ante on a clinical basis? The fact that the person in the above example had a negative test result even though the ex ante chance of having the disease was one in one hundred does not imply that the test was unnecessary. This is not to assert that there are no frivolous claims, but rather that not every claim that turns out to have been "invalid" is frivolous. The term "frivolous lawsuits" has been used much too loosely in public discourse about medical malpractice. At a superfi cial level, the New York study offers "good news" for advocates on both sides of the medical malpractice debate. In the end, myth 1 is partially valid; there are both too many invalid claims and too few valid claims. The system, in sum, is imperfect.
Chapter Roadmap
The intended audience for this book is nonspecialists. With this in mind, the text unites several areas of academic research in medical malpractice.
It is diffi cult to be well versed in all of the topics presented, and for that reason we aim to provide a text useful for anyone interested in medical malpractice. A reader who is familiar with the legal issues will be made aware of the political issues. In the same way, a reader who is familiar with the political issues may not have previously understood how insurance works.
This chapter and the next three chapters describe what is known about the functioning of medical malpractice insurance, defensive medicine, and the effects of tort reforms implemented to date. Chapter 2 describes why insurance cycles arise. "Hard markets" characterized by sharply rising medical malpractice premiums and withdrawal of insurers from the market have led to much political pressure for policy changes. Further, advocates for particular statutory changes base their arguments for change on their theories of the origins of cycles.
Chapter 3 analyzes effects of rising medical malpractice premiums and the threat of lawsuits. Arguments for change are often linked to the concepts of positive and negative defensive medicine. Positive defensive medicine involves the use of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in excess of levels that physicians would recommend solely on the basis of their professional clinical judgments. Negative defensive medicine involves withdrawal of care because of high premiums and/or the threat of lawsuits.
Chapter 4 describes tort reforms and their effects. Refl ecting the goals of the stakeholders who promote tort reforms and refl ected in the term "tort reform," success has been gauged in terms of whether or not, and the extent to which, specifi c tort reforms reduce medical malpractice claims frequency, insurance payments, and premiums. The "prizewinners" to date are caps on nonmonetary loss and on total loss. A large body of evidence is generally consistent with the view that caps reduce payments of insurers, and also decrease the variance in anticipated loss, and lead to lower medical malpractice premiums.
Some tort reforms in effect transfer money from injury victims and their attorneys to health care providers. Flat caps on damages, the overwhelming favorite of the lobbies for provider organizations, particularly since 2000, fall in this category. Placing a cap on damages has no potential for improving patient safety. In addition, this policy disproportionately makes plaintiffs with severe injuries worse off. A stronger argument for limits on awards is that there is considerable variation in awards, limiting, among other things, the injury deterrent signal. As an alternative to fl at caps, chapter 5 examines proposals to fully schedule damages for nonmonetary loss rather than just place limits on the high payments. Another alternative to fi xed lump-sum payments, periodic payments, or even a complement to scheduled damages, is service benefi t insurance contracts to cover medical, custodial, educational, and rehabilitative services. Chapter 5 also describes a proposal for service benefi t contracts.
Damage caps do reduce medical malpractice premiums and are favored for this reason, but again, they disproportionately disadvantage claimants with severe injuries. We propose more equitable methods for limiting damages and providing more consistent compensation, both horizontally (for plaintiffs with similar injuries) and vertically (for plaintiffs with more severe or less severe injuries and loss).
Much of this book is about avoiding misguided reforms. Limitations on lawyers' contingent fees are a case in point, for reasons described in chapter 6. Such limitations represent a partial incomes policy, one which redistributes income from plaintiffs' lawyers to physicians and perhaps to others as well. The data that have been presented to show that plaintiffs' attorneys have excessive earnings are seriously fl awed. Moreover, if there is concern about earnings inequality, this should be addressed by a broad policy change, not by concentrating on a single occupation, such as plaintiffs' lawyers. Even if the data on plaintiff lawyers' earnings were accurate, such lawyers are not the only persons to enjoy high earnings. Defendants' lawyers are likely to have similar earnings, on average. Moreover, some insurance executives are very well compensated, as are physicians in some specialties. As much as fee limits bar access to legal representation, they do this indiscriminately, affecting access to legal representation of potential claimants with and without meritorious claims.
Chapter 6, which describes empirical evidence on this issue, as well as some prominent policy proposals, concludes that no change is warranted in this area. Aside from the lack of empirical support for arguments supporting change, in terms of horizontal equity (equal treatment of equals) it seems imprudent to impose constraints on fees of attorneys who represent claimants without likewise imposing constraints on individuals in other highly compensated professions.
Chapter 7 examines empirical evidence on jury behavior, fi nding that "runaway juries" perhaps appear in a few highly publicized cases and more generally make good fi ction, but do not apply to the typical jury. One solution to a "runaway jury" problem, thought in part to stem from jurors' inability to process relevant scientifi c information and in part due to jurors' alleged sympathy with injury victims, is to shift medical malpractice cases to specialized health courts. Regulatory agencies and even judges may not be equally sensitive to consumer interests, although, after considerable discussion in this book, we leave as an open question whether or not health courts should be implemented. The pros and cons of this policy option are evaluated in chapter 7.
Existing tort reforms do not make care safer. There has been much discussion of patient safety, especially since around 2000, including the high rates of medical errors that occur. As chapter 8 indicates, in spite of all the national attention the issue of medical errors has received, surprisingly little progress has been made in implementing error reduction systems. This is partly because meaningful fi nancial incentives for health care providers to adopt patient safety measures have been lacking.
In principle, tort liability could provide such incentives, but not as it is currently structured in the medical fi eld. And under the best of circumstances, tort liability is only one of several policy instruments that can be applied to make medical care safer than it is now. The threat of a lawsuit would presumably deter such errors, but (1) there is empirical evidence that such errors are widespread (although there is some disagreement about how widespread they are), and (2) some experts even argue that medical malpractice has been counterproductive in achieving the objective of reducing medical error rates.
One impediment appears to be the lack of a fi nancial incentive to implement such systems. Not only is there a general lack of a market incentive, but medical liability is not playing a positive role. Physicians practicing alone or in small groups may not be well positioned to make major investments in error reduction approaches. This suggests that hospitals may be in a relatively good position to do this; there is a good case for enterprise liability at the hospital level. Physicians would be included for the care they provide within the walls of the hospital, in both inpatient and outpatient settings.
Following chapter 2's discussion of insurance cycles, chapters 9 through 11 discuss medical malpractice insurance. Chapter 9 focuses on the lack of experience rating of medical malpractice, insurance regulation, the various alternative ownership forms that insurance companies can and do take, and government interventions to assure health care providers access to medical malpractice insurance coverage and to cover losses in the event of insurer bankruptcy.
Chapter 10 discusses private markets for reinsurance and the rationale for and experience with government provision of such insurance. Volatility in reinsurance markets is one cause of cycles in markets for primary medical malpractice insurance. One approach for reducing the amplitudes of cycles, which can be quite disruptive, especially in some geographic locations and physician specialties, is to substitute publicly provided for privately provided reinsurance, an option considered in chapters 10 and 12.
Chapter 11 focuses on provision of medical no-fault insurance as a substitute for standard third-party medical malpractice (or professional liability) insurance. A voluntary no-fault plan in which hospitals and patients can elect no-fault has attractive features. However, no-fault insurance for iatrogenic injuries, such as exists in Sweden and New Zealand, is not an achievable alternative in the United States. The experiences with medical no-fault in Florida and Virginia, and of the federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, demonstrate limitations of medical no-fault, U.S.-style. While there are some advocates of substantial expansions in no-fault coverage among academic experts, the proof of the pudding is in actual implementation. The successes of no-fault in some other countries have been impossible to replicate in the United States. Therefore, the recommendation in chapter 11 is to expand voluntary, hospital-based, no-fault insurance as a substitute for tort liability/insurance and to do this by contract.
In the concluding chapter, chapter 12, the focus is on public policy reforms that have promise in terms of improving quality of care and determining injuries in health care settings. The chapter recommends locating insurance coverage with the hospital as the insuring unit for all care delivered within its walls. Much of the loss is incurred in hospital settings. Certainly the high premiums in such specialties as obstetrics/ gynecology and neurosurgery refl ect the medical malpractice risk from care delivered at hospitals. Nevertheless, even though physicians would be covered for care they deliver in hospital inpatient and outpatient facilities, they would still purchase medical malpractice coverage for services delivered in their own practices. Enterprise liability with the hospital as the enterprise is also an attractive option, but it is a somewhat more radical change that may face greater resistance. Under enterprise liability, only the enterprise (the hospital) would be sued.
In sum, in terms of the four markets, chapters 6 and 7 are most directly about the legal market; chapters 2 and 9-11, about the medical malpractice insurance market; chapters 3 and 8, mostly about the medical care market; and chapters 4, 5, and 12 mostly about the government market and public policy.
